Cocoa crossroads – Reform or relapse

By Bill BEDZRAH

In Ghana’s Western North Region, the cocoa harvest should be a time of movement and money. Instead, 2025 has brought silence in many villages, broken only by the anger of farmers waiting months for overdue payments. Ghana, long hailed as a model cocoa producer, is now confronting a structural crisis in its most strategic export sector.

For four decades, cocoa has underpinned macroeconomic stability, rural livelihoods, and Ghana’s international creditworthiness. Yet after a record 1.04 million tonnes in the 2020/21 season, production has fallen for three consecutive years, reaching just about 531,000 tonnes in 2023/24 before a partial recovery forecast to 700,000–750,000 tonnes in 2024/25 and 2025/26. The collapse in output has coincided with a liquidity crunch that has left warehouses full, farmers unpaid, and policy credibility in doubt.

A financing experiment gone wrong

For over 30 years, the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) relied on an annual syndicated loan, typically between 1 and US$1.5 billion, to finance the purchase of beans from farmers at the start of each season. It was expensive but predictable, allowing Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) to pay farmers promptly and enabling Ghana to honour forward sales contracts.

From 2023 onward, pressured by rising public debt and global borrowing costs, policymakers pushed COCOBOD towards a “self?financing” model, relying more on pre?financing from international buyers. When global cocoa prices spiked on the back of poor harvests and market volatility, traders became more cautious in extending upfront credit. The result has been a classic liquidity trap: COCOBOD lacks cash to pay LBCs; LBCs cannot pay farmers; and beans sit in inland warehouses rather than moving to port.

The contrast is stark, Ghana is facing some of its tightest supply conditions in decades with 2024/25 output projected at between 590,000 and 700,000 tonnes, well below historic averages yet farmers and the government alike are starved of liquidity.

Essentially the financing issue in the cocoa sector has morphed into a confidence crisis with farmers uncertain about payments for their hard toiled cocoa yields.

Côte d’Ivoire – Same crop, different strategy

The cocoa crisis in Ghana looks even more severe when set against neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. Together, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire still supply more than 60percent of the world’s cocoa, but their responses to price volatility and climate stress are opposite.? While Ghana has remained heavily dependent on exporting raw beans, The Government of Côte d’Ivoire spent the last decade under the office of the President and the Prime Minster deliberately pushing domestic processing.

The Ivorian government uses differentiated export taxes and investment incentives to encourage grinders to locate onshore. By 2024, domestic processors were handling roughly 777,000 tonnes about 44percent of the country’s harvest of 1.76 million tonnes.

In 2023, Côte d’Ivoire exported around 1.34 million tonnes of raw cocoa worth US$3.5 billion, but also 648,000 tonnes of processed products such as cocoa liquor, cocoa butter, and cocoa powder worth about 2.67 billion USD, earning nearly double the value per tonne of processed cocoa compared with raw beans.               

New investments like the Transcao CI PK24 complex outside Abidjan, a US$235 million grinding and storage facility that doubled the state company’s capacity to 100,000 tonnes, signal a clear state-backed industrial vision.

In Ghana, no comparable, fully funded roadmap exists to move Ghana towards processing even half of its annual harvest, compared to the 100percent target Côte D’Ivoire is currently projecting for 2030.

2023–2025 – Evidence of structural vulnerability

Recent production and trade data underline how exposed Ghana has become.

• Ghana’s cocoa bean output fell from 683,269 tonnes in 2021/22 to 655,808 tonnes in 2022/23, then to approximately 530,873 tonnes in 2023/24.
• Early indications for 2024/25 suggest a rebound to around 700,000 tonnes, but still well below the five?year average of roughly 800,000 tonnes and far off the 1.04 million?tonne peak.
• Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus (CSSV), three seasons of irregular rainfall, and land degradation linked to illegal mining have all eroded farm productivity.

At the same time, domestic consumption of cocoa products remains minimal. Estimates put Ghana’s 2024/25 domestic grind at only around 35,000 tonnes, with per capita cocoa consumption stuck at roughly 1 kilogram per year a fraction of levels in Europe or North America. Ghana is, in practical terms, still exporting nearly all its value.

Value addition as economic sovereignty

The lesson from the last three seasons is clear: exporting raw cocoa locks Ghana into a low?margin, high?risk corner of the value chain. The alternative is to treat cocoa as an industrial input, not just a fiscal commodity.

The proposed National Cocoa Value Chain Integration & Competitiveness Conference (NCVCIC 2026) seeks to provide exactly that pivot. Its premise is that Ghana must build a dense ecosystem of domestic processors from large grinders to specialised chocolatiers that can absorb beans in poor price years, convert them into semi?finished or finished products, and hold inventory until global conditions improve.

In this model, the state ceases to be a perpetual borrower against future cocoa receipts. Instead, Ghana becomes more of a price maker: selling branded chocolate, cocoa butter, cocoa powder, and cocoa liquor in global markets that pay for quality, traceability, and origin stories rather than treating Ghanaian cocoa as an undifferentiated bulk commodity. The objective is to reduce mass export of raw beans and divest into exporting valued added cocoa derivative brands thus converting every processed cocoa into a bargaining power for Ghana.

Ghana’s Emerging Cocoa Middle Class

Encouragingly, the building blocks of a more sophisticated cocoa economy already exist.

• Fairafric, a German?Ghanaian venture operating a modern factory in Suhum, retains significantly more value per bar in Ghana by producing organic chocolate “tree?to?bar” locally. One analysis suggests that while conventional chocolate leaves about US$0.13 of added value in Ghana per bar, Fairafric’s model keeps roughly US$0.74 a more than four?fold increase.
• Niche Cocoa has grown from a bulk processor into a fully integrated player, exporting cocoa ingredients while also building its own branded consumer products, demonstrating at scale that Ghanaian firms can compete beyond intermediate processing.
• A new generation of local chocolate brands including 57 Chocolates, Allsave Chocolates, Adansi Sweets, Bioko Treats, Amonu Chocolates, and Cherelle Chocolates are carving out niche markets domestically and abroad, capitalising on demand for craft, origin?specific chocolate under the guardianship and export market support from the Ghana Export Promotion Authority (GEPA) policy

Small and Medium scale investments in Indigenous cocoa brands have created numerous direct and indirect employment in catchment Regions of Ghana while associated skills programmes train a new school of Ghanaian chocolate makers and technicians. Similar spillovers skills and technical knowhow are beginning to appear around other processors and artisanal brands.

Yet these successes remain the exception, not the norm. Without targeted policy, they will remain islands of excellence in a sea of raw?bean dependency.

Policy Agenda Aligned with National Cocoa Value Chain Integration & Competitiveness Conference (NCVCIC) Agenda.

To transform Ghana’s cocoa trajectory between now and 2030, policymakers must align sector reform with the upcoming NCVCIC agenda, which focuses on value?chain integration, competitiveness, and farmer welfare.

Some of the recommendations under the agenda include:

1. Stabilising liquidity and restore farmer confidence

• Rebuild a credible seasonal financing framework – Combine a leaner syndicated loan with structured trade finance and pre?export facilities, avoiding over?reliance on any single “self?financing” mechanism.
• Ring?fence farmer payments – Establish a transparent escrow or trust mechanism ensuring that once beans are delivered to LBCs, funds for farm?gate payments are prioritised and insulated from legacy debts and other liabilities.
• Clear arrears on a fixed timetable – Use a time?bound, government?backed facility, as envisaged in the NCVCIC proposal, to clear verified farmer and LBC arrears and publicly communicate a repayment schedule to rebuild confidence.

2. Implement the NCVCIC value chain integration agenda

The NCVCIC proposal centres on integrating all nodes of the cocoa value chain from inputs and farming to processing, branding, logistics, and exports under a coherent national competitiveness roadmap.

• National Cocoa Competitiveness Framework – Adopt the NCVCIC framework as official policy, with measurable targets for productivity, domestic processing shares, export diversification, and farmer incomes, using 2023–2025 performance as the baseline.
• Integrated Value Chain Platform – Create a permanent multi?stakeholder platform (farmers, LBCs, processors, SMEs, financiers, regulators) to oversee implementation, troubleshoot bottlenecks, and regularly update policy based on real?time data.
• Cluster and corridor development – Prioritise cocoa industrial clusters in key producing regions, with shared infrastructure reliable power, logistics hubs, quality laboratories to reduce unit costs for SMEs and large processors.

3. Build a competitive processing and SME ecosystem

Consistent with NCVCIC’s emphasis on value addition, Ghana should pursue an explicit “bean?to?brand” strategy that uses both large processors and SMEs as engines of rural industrialisation.

• Targeted tax incentives for value?added output – Offer time?bound tax holidays and accelerated capital allowances for Ghanaian firms producing finished chocolate, confectionery, and specialised cocoa ingredients in Ghana, not just bulk liquor or butter.
• Cocoa Industrialization and Innovation Fund – Operationalise an NCVCIC?aligned facility within Ghana Exim Bank, providing long?tenor, concessional finance for SMEs (such as Fairafric, Niche Chocolates, 57 Chocolates, Allsave Chocolates, Adansi Sweets Chocolate, Bioko Treats Chocolates, Amonu Chocolates, Cherelle chocolates) to invest in machinery, food?safety systems, Research &Development, and export market entry.
• Skills and technology upgrading – Roll out technical programmes in quality control, product development, branding, and packaging, in partnership with universities and technical institutes, to build a skilled cocoa manufacturing workforce.

4. Expand domestic and regional demand

The NCVCIC proposal recognises that a successful processing strategy needs reliable markets at home and in the region, not just in Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia and North America.

• Local consumption mandate – Introduce a phased requirement that school feeding programmes, security services, and public institutions source a minimum share of cocoa products from Ghanaian manufacturers, with clear quality and nutrition standards.
• “Cocoa for Ghanaians” campaign – Launch a national campaign to promote daily consumption of Ghana?made cocoa beverages and chocolate, linking cocoa to health, education, and national?pride narratives.
• Regional market strategy – Use ECOWAS frameworks to reduce non?tariff barriers and actively promote Ghanaian cocoa products in West African markets, positioning Accra and Abidjan as complementary processing hubs rather than pure competitors.

5. Governance, data, and presidential leadership

NCVCIC positions cocoa as a strategic asset that requires direct presidential leadership and rigorous, data?driven governance.

• Presidential Cocoa Competitiveness Council – Establish a high?level council chaired by the President, with cabinet?level representation (Finance, Agriculture, Trade, Energy) and private?sector and farmer leaders, to oversee the NCVCIC roadmap.
• Unified data and monitoring system – Create an integrated cocoa data platform tracking production, prices, financing flows, processing volumes, and farmer incomes, with annual public reporting against NCVCIC targets
• Enhanced Côte d’Ivoire partnership – Use the NCVCIC platform to deepen Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire coordination on the Living Income Differential (LID), joint marketing, and complementary investment in processing, ensuring that both countries move up the value chain together rather than competing on raw bean prices.

The role of the presidency

Ultimately, this is no longer an issue COCOBOD can handle alone. The cocoa crisis touches fiscal policy, trade, industrialisation, climate resilience, and rural security. Only the Office of the President can align the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and Ministry of Trade and Industry behind a coherent, time?bound competitiveness agenda.

A Presidential Initiative on Cocoa Competitiveness anchored in NCVCIC and convening cabinet, private processors, farmer leaders, and international partners would send a powerful signal that Accra understands the stakes. It should set explicit targets for:

• Production recovery with climate?smart replanting and CSSV control by 2028.
• Domestic processing shares, for example, at least 40percent of beans processed locally by 2030.
• Increased domestic consumption through public procurement and national campaigns.

If the 2025/26 season ends with continued arrears, declining yields, and stalled industrial projects, Ghana risks ceding not just market share but moral authority in the global cocoa debate. The choices made in Accra over the next 12–24 months will determine whether cocoa remains a pillar of national resilience or a cautionary tale of squandered advantage.

“Ghana must take a decisive step to address a 21st?century challenge with a 20th?century commodity model.”

>>>the writer is a seasoned International Trade & Investment Expert with over 15 years of experience in global markets, specializing in trade development, export strategy, and market access facilitation. Proven track record in strengthening economic partnerships between Africa and international markets, with extensive expertise in trade controls, sanctions, and corporate governance. Demonstrated success in developing export markets and implementing strategic trade initiatives across multiple African regions

He has a Master of Laws (LL.M) European & International Trade & Investment Law; Master of Laws (LL.M) International Business Law; Master of Arts (MA) International Relations; and a Bachelor of Arts (BA) Communication Studies. He can be reached via [email protected], [email protected]  and or LinkedIn: linkedin.com/in/bedzrah

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