The Bank of Ghana (BoG) has disclosed that its Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP) and related Gold for Reserves (G4R) operations posted cumulative net losses of over GH¢7 billion between 2022 and 2024. Figures for 2025 are still under external audit.
The disclosure was contained in a January 12, 2026 response to the Multimedia Group’s Right to Information (RTI) request, signed by Ernest Nii Sowah Ahulu, Acting Head of the Bank’s Financial Markets Department.
It provides the clearest official breakdown yet of the financial performance of the programme, which was launched during the economic crisis to stabilise the cedi and rebuild foreign exchange reserves.
Losses mount sharply
According to the Bank, net losses rose from GH¢74.44 million in 2022 to GH¢1.37 billion in 2023, before climbing to GH¢5.66 billion in 2024.
By the end of 2024, cumulative losses from Gold for Oil (G40) and G4R transactions stood at approximately GH¢7.1 billion.
Gold purchases under the programme expanded rapidly over the same period. Volumes rose from 3.47 tonnes in 2022 to 37.02 tonnes in 2023, 56.47 tonnes in 2024, and 110.99 tonnes in 2025. In value terms, purchases increased from US$194.43 million in 2022 to US$1.55 billion in 2023, US$4.07 billion in 2024, and US$11.39 billion in 2025.
Losses were attributed to gold and oil-linked transactions under the G40 framework, as well as artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) gold under the G4R programme. ASM-related losses were GH¢74 million in 2022, GH¢152.15 million in 2023, and GH¢54.84 million in 2024.
The BoG described the DGPP as a “strategic programme” aimed at increasing and diversifying foreign exchange reserves, supporting currency stability, and restoring confidence in the economy. The Bank stressed that the programme was part of efforts to strengthen FX buffers during a period of severe macroeconomic stress.
Ongoing scrutiny
The release of these figures comes amid continuing debate over the true cost of crisis-era interventions, including gold-for-oil deals and quasi-fiscal operations. Economists caution that while gold-backed strategies can help boost FX reserves, they carry risks linked to commodity price volatility, operational inefficiencies, and accounting distortions.
With billions of cedis confirmed as losses, calls are mounting for clearer disclosure on transaction structures, risk allocation, and safeguards to protect public funds. Figures for 2025, which recorded a sharp rise in gold volumes, are expected to provide further insight once audit confirmation is complete.
GoldBod Generated US$3.8bn in Foreign Exchange Inflows – Report
In another development, a technical report submitted to the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) has indicated that the programme generated significant macroeconomic gains in 2025, including billions of dollars in additional foreign exchange inflows and reduced reliance on external borrowing.
The report, titled Evaluating the Macroeconomic Effects of the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod), was authored by Prof. Festus Ebo Turkson and Mr. Peter Junior Dotse of the Department of Economics, University of Ghana, and Prof. Agyapomaa Gyeke-Dako of the University of Ghana Business School.
It assessed the macro-economic impact of GoldBod, using conservative assumptions and verifiable data, and compared the benefits from reduced gold smuggling and non-debt foreign exchange inflows with reported gold trading losses by the Bank of Ghana (BoG).
According to the report, recorded artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) gold exports increased from 63.6 metric tonnes in 2024 to 103.0 metric tonnes in 2025, representing an increment of 39.4 metric tonnes.
The authors stated that the additional volume was plausibly gold previously lost to smuggling that had now been formalised through GoldBod’s operations.
Valued conservatively at US$96.5 million per tonne, the incremental gold exports are estimated to have generated approximately US$3.8 billion in foreign exchange inflows into the formal economy.
The report compared these gains with the US$214 million gold trading loss reported by the BoG and referenced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
It stated that formalising just 2.2 metric tonnes of gold would have been sufficient to offset the reported loss, adding that the total formalised volume was about 18 times that threshold.
In terms of financing, the report said GoldBod-enabled ASM exports in 2025 amounted to US$10.8 billion.
It noted that if Ghana had mobilised equivalent foreign exchange through external borrowing, annual interest costs would have ranged between US$756 million and US$1.08 billion, based on borrowing rates of between 7 and 10 per cent.
Focusing only on the reduction in gold smuggling, the report estimated avoided annual interest costs of between US$266 million and US$380 million, describing these as recurring annual savings.
The report further linked GoldBod-supported foreign exchange inflows to broader macroeconomic outcomes, including international reserves of approximately US$11–12 billion, exchange rate stabilisation and appreciation relative to IMF programme assumptions, and a reduction in the domestic cost of external debt servicing estimated at GHS 6.2 billion.
It also reported a reduction in the valuation of the import bill between January and October 2025, estimated at GHS 50.6 billion, as well as disinflation resulting from reduced exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices.
On the reported BoG trading loss, the authors said most of the loss reflected accounting translation effects rather than actual cash losses.
They explained that gold was purchased at near-retail exchange rates to discourage smuggling, while foreign exchange inflows were booked at the lower interbank rate, resulting in accounting losses.
The report estimated the true economic cost of GoldBod operations, including fees, purity losses and offtake discounts, at approximately 2.5 per cent of gold value.
The authors recommended sustaining price competitiveness to prevent a return of smuggling, improving transparency in BoG reporting by separating accounting effects from economic costs, strengthening governance and oversight, and funding GoldBod’s policy costs through the national budget.
The report concluded that GoldBod should be regarded as a macroeconomic stabilisation and formalisation tool rather than a profit-driven trading entity.
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The post Government Lost GH¢7Bn From 2022 TO 2024 …Through Gold For Reserves And Domestic Gold Purchase Programmes – BoG appeared first on The Ghanaian Chronicle.
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